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Referral review completed by NIMA 3/2/01


COMIREX MAPPING, CHARTING AND GEODESY WORKING GROUP

Minutes of Meeting Held in Room 1D918

Pentagon

1300-1530, 24 September 1968

PRESIDING



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Purpose of Meeting - General

1. The Chairman welcomed [REDACTED] the new representative of Department of Army, and three representatives from the CIA as observers or advisers. He further pointed out that because of a conflict in meetings [REDACTED] would be unable to attend.

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2. NRO Proposals for Meeting Worldwide Positioning Requirements

a. [REDACTED] indicated that this was an important subject on the agenda but regretted that the NRO representative was unable to attend.

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explained that Department of Defense had held several meetings concerning the NRO proposals for worldwide positioning and that technical evaluations covered in these meetings were the basis for the DoD position which had been circulated to the COMIREX MC&G Working Group on 18 September. raised a question as to whether there was any closer agreement as to what could be achieved through adding the Doppler to the KH-4B system. It was explained that informal discussions with the NRO had indicated that the area of disagreement had been narrowed and that there may not be a major problem in arriving at a common agreement. In essence, the DoD position was that the adding of the TRANSIT Beacon to the KH-4B system with the DISIC will enable exceeding the worldwide positioning accuracy requirement and that the SGLS will not be significant in reaching this objective. It was concluded that technical discussions and evaluations should be undertaken immediately with NRO. recommended that the Chairman ask DIA to organize a Sub-Working Group of the MCGWG consisting of key technical personnel to arrive at a common understanding of what accuracies may be achieved at what cost and at what time period by adding the TRANSIT Beacon to the KH-4B system. Following request for comments from the group, it was concluded to proceed with the Sub-Working Group in line with the above objective and members were asked to furnish names of participants to requested the DIA to provide a chairman for the Sub-Working Group. It was explained that this action was essential in order to place information which would establish a common understanding of accuracies, costs and time periods in a proposed paper to Chairman, COMIREX, and that the Sub-Working Group should try to complete their action in four or five working days.

b. It was concluded that Project 482 could most likely contribute to meeting positioning requirements in addition to adding the TRANSIT Beacon to the KH-4B system, but that more technical and program information is needed in order to evaluate its geodetic potential.

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
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d. [REDACTED] explained that DIA was examining both the current and projected accuracy requirements and target positioning programs to provide information to be included in a proposed COMIREX paper. This paper would also include the accuracies obtainable, cost and time period analyses resulting from the efforts of the Sub-Working Group cited in subparagraph a. above. It was agreed that the MCGWG Working Group would want to review carefully the language in such a paper. [REDACTED] suggested that an appropriate course of action could be the updating of COMOR D-13/65 of June 1966 which first stated the positioning requirement of 450 feet horizontal and 300 feet vertical, 90% assurance.

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f. [REDACTED] urged all personnel to act promptly in providing membership to the Sub-Working Group cited in subparagraph a. above.

Positioning of Reconnaissance Objectives

3. [REDACTED] to provide background concerning this subject (copy of NPIC memorandum for Chairman, COMIREX, stamped "Working Paper" and dated 4 September 1968 was forwarded to MCGWG members as item b. on 18 September 1968). [REDACTED] remarked generally that the whole question related to NPIC responding to the need for positioning of reconnaissance targets. [REDACTED] outlined background stating that the basic need was to position targets for [REDACTED] in response to prompt action requests from the SOC of NRO. The technical work was performed by [REDACTED] and involved using a simple computer orbital program to place targets in a position for [REDACTED] photography. [REDACTED] indicated that he was aware of the much more comprehensive capability for positioning targets in DoD operational units but that NPIC activity had progressed as a short response effort

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in which NPIC had undertaken the necessary work itself. He pointed out that the quick response capability would be enhanced by a stellar comparator which would obviate the need for tedious mensuration and reduction from stellar cameras included in the SI package. The analysis had indicated that an accuracy of three minutes was needed to obtain 1,000 ft. positioning accuracy and the critical factor was the sensitivity when the camera was swung laterally to approximately 45 degrees. ██████████ asked if there had been any requests made by NPIC to the DoD for positioning individual targets and ██████████ indicated that he thought no requests had been made. ██████████ mentioned that DIA had obtained a check by ACIC as to the reason there had been such large corrections in positioning targets from ██████████ efforts. It was disclosed through these checks and subsequent analysis that the problem was not really a geodetic positioning one, but rather a relatively simple cartographic problem to correct target coordinates falling generally in three classes including:

- a. Coordinates derived hastily or from very poor maps and charts at small scale existing some time ago which had not been checked against much more recent and reliable compilations from satellite photography.
- b. Uncertainties as to the actual identification of the target whether in a city or surrounding area, etc., and;
- c. Plain accidental errors in arriving at the coordinates.

It was mentioned that everyone was aware of the geodetic reduction efforts and production of Multiple Use Manuscripts at AMS and ACIC, and the Missile Target Data Sheet positioning and the precise installation positioning at ACIC related to Series 200 charts. ██████████ pointed out that ACIC procedures in responding to positioning of missile targets required that positions be established as near to 450 feet as possible and provided SAC within 48 hours. The DoD capability and currently available data could be used for positioning targets, and there had been a DIA procedure outlined for making use of this capability for positioning targets. However, the need for such positioning for the ██████████ system was recognized by DIA as a matter being handled by the ICRS Committee of COMIREX and that DIA was proposing to this Committee a procedure calling for DoD positioning of targets meeting certain agreed upon criteria. Following discussion it was agreed that the initiative on this action should be taken by the ICRS Subcommittee. Following action to define an appropriate positioning program, the need for quick response attitude capability on the ██████████ system could be addressed.

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
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Evaluation Criteria for KH-4 and KH-4B Photography

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5. This criteria had been updated by discussions between evaluation personnel of AMS and DIAMC representatives and was forwarded to members for discussion of any problems that might be indicated. Mr. [REDACTED] commented that he was glad to see an up-to-date expression of the evaluation criteria. There was general agreement that the criteria was satisfactory except that [REDACTED] pointed out that it had been prepared by evaluation personnel and that the using personnel in Army operational activities and staff personnel had not completed their reviews and may have comments on changes. Further, it was recognized that the effort by [REDACTED] CIA, to place KH-4 requirements on a computer could result in additional or modified criteria. It was noted that the 10,000 square miles minimum area criteria seemed inappropriate in bad weather areas outside the Sino-Soviet and should be changed. It was concluded that the criteria circulated to members should be accepted as the current criteria subject to possible changes from additional reviews and the studying of refined criteria in connection with the computer programming of requirements.

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Need for DISICS on KH-4B Missions

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6. [REDACTED] mentioned that the DIA analysis had concluded that the latest schedule of three missions to be operated without DISICS as

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advanced by the NRO on 5 September was satisfactory based upon considerations at this time. However, there were further questions asked by the Chairman, COMIREX, which were not addressed in the discussion at the meeting. Accordingly, comments on these questions will be taken up in the future MC&G Working Group meeting at which time MCGWG action on this item can be completed.

Utilization of UTB Film in KH-4B DISIC

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
7. [REDACTED] read from a DIAMC staff action whereby contact had been made with the technical personnel of AMS, ACIC and NAVOCEANO and agreement reached that option B of the NRO memorandum of 20 June 1968, subject: Utilization of UTB Film in DISIC, should be adopted. This option calls for adding 200 feet (480 frames) to the terrain film load and the proposal was made that this UTB film be exposed over test areas. Tests would then be accomplished, particularly by AMS and ACIC and results achieved used as a basis to determine whether to proceed further with UTB film. This approach was considered satisfactory by all members and it was agreed that a memorandum to Chairman, COMIREX, be prepared setting forth this conclusion of the MC&G Working Group.

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[REDACTED]
 COLONEL, USA
 CHAIRMAN
 COMIREX MC&G Working Group

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